I
will post three interviews with Igor Girkin:
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Caricature
of Igor Strelkov
[PHOTO
SOURCE: http://icorpus.ru/svodka-ot-strelkova-24-07-2014-133-msk/]
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Igor Strelkov:
Resumption of War in Ukraine Inevitable
Lola Fri, Apr 24,
2015
According
to Igor Strelkov, there is no doubt that Ukraine intends to go to war
with Russia.
A
correspondent of the Eurasian News Fairway interviewed Igor Ivanovich
Strelkov (Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin—military leader of the Donetsk People’s
Republic [DPR], a former commander of the insurgents in the city of Slavyansk and
organizer of the forces of the People’s Militia in Donetsk) in the course of
his visit to one of the cities of the Russian Federation. The visit was
arranged for the purpose of raising much needed funds for the population of the
Donetsk and the Lugansk People’s Republics [LPR] as well as activating the
operations of the local chapter of the “Novorossiya” public movement.
The
coup in Kiev was paid for with US funds, was directed by the United States,
and the incumbent Ukrainian government is simply a marionette…
and the incumbent Ukrainian government is simply a marionette…
Eurasian
News Fairway [ENF]: Igor Ivanovich, I will open with the most “terrifying”
question. In your interview with the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies you
say that war awaits Russia. What scenarios of its inception and development,
methods of conducting it and possible consequences do you see?
Igor
Strelkov [IS]: Ukraine will make attempts to strike against Novorossiya with a
view to eliminating it entirely, and because Russia cannot allow the
destruction of Novorossiya—cannot allow the genocide of the Russian people, the
Russian population living there—then Moscow could somehow be drawn into a war.
It is difficult to tell what the scale of this involvement could be. But the
fact that Ukraine clearly intends to make war against Russia is entirely beyond
doubt. Even if Novorossiya is surrendered, Ukraine will sooner or later unleash
a war for Crimea because it does not recognize its transition into Russia, is
not going to recognize it and almost openly declares that it will fight for the
peninsula, by military means if necessary.
ENF:
Speaking of war, do you mean a war “at the instigation of”?
IS:
Naturally. The coup in Kiev was paid for with US funds, was directed by the
United States, and the incumbent Ukrainian government is simply a marionette
created for a confrontation with Russia, including by military means. It is for
this reason that Ukraine makes no concessions—none whatsoever. Even the most
minor. They do not observe even the Minsk accords that are, in principle,
theoretically advantageous [to them], but instead use them only as a temporary
respite for accumulating forces and a means to further wage ware.
[The
Minsk accords] are not in the least favourable to the People’s Republics
and the Militia because they signify the elimination of both of them.
and the Militia because they signify the elimination of both of them.
ENF:
What is your opinion of the Minsk accords?
IS:
Generally positive, although I do not believe in their implementation because I
have information that leads me to believe that even such advantageous
agreements—I emphasize this—Ukraine does not intend to respect. Kiev’s only
goal is war—an objective they pursue because their owners demand it
of them.
ENF:
Do these accords benefit primarily Ukraine?
IS:
Theoretically, yes. In any event, they are not in the least favourable to the
People’s Republics (DPR and LPR ‒ed.) and the Militia because they signify the
elimination of both of them.
[T]he
rebellion had already started: people were already manning the barricades
armed with weapons, and the Ukrainian security forces were killing them.
armed with weapons, and the Ukrainian security forces were killing them.
ENF:
In one of your relatively recent interviews—given after your return from
war-torn Novorossiya—you mentioned that you acknowledge a certain degree of
responsibility for the outbreak of the “hot” phase of the conflict. Does this
mean that, in your estimation, the people of the Donbass would not have offered
such resolute resistance with the help of Russian volunteers and, shall we say,
“other” support from Russia?
IS:
You should understand that responsibility can be felt in different ways. It can
be experienced as a sense of guilt. But I have not felt guilt as such, and I
hope I never will. I continue to carry responsibility for what is happening
there because I actively participated in the events, because many people who
now fight at the front, who help the Militia—they joined the army because of my
appeals, while I was still there. This is the first point.
The
second point is that if our unit, which played an organizing role, which served
as a fuse, had not arrived in Slavyansk, the uprisings in Donetsk and Lugansk
would have been crushed. An organizing force, a centre of consolidation, is
exactly what was needed there. But the rebellion had already started: people
were already manning the barricades armed with weapons, and the Ukrainian
security forces were killing them. Except that this uprising would have ended
the same way that it did in Kharkov and in Odessa. In other words, there would
have been several dozen corpses in Donetsk and in Lugansk alike, there would
have been punitive operations, there would have been arrests and seizures.
There
was a chance that this rebellion would not have transformed itself into a
large-scale war of national liberation or would have become one at a later
stage. But history does not possess a subjunctive mood. What happened,
happened. However, because the war marches on and persists, as someone who
fired some of the first shots in this war and led a unit that seized the organs
of state power in Slavyansk, I naturally carry responsibility.
[Information
warfare] creates among people a completely distorted picture.
Such that, when people come face-to-face with reality, they cannot grasp it correctly.
ENF:
You have spoken about the Ukrainian side’s use of neurolinguistic programming,
in particular, through Channel Five on Ukrainian TV. You have mentioned that
you, yourself, felt its effects. We are talking about a component of
information warfare. In your opinion, how important is the role of this factor
in information warfare, and, in turn, of information warfare in hot conflicts?
IS:
Its role is exceptionally important, because it (information warfare ‒ed.)
creates among people a completely distorted picture. Such that, when people
come face-to-face with reality, they cannot grasp it correctly. The effect it
produces is so serious that it is like drug addiction. Moreover, I came across
locals who for hours could not tear themselves away from this news programme
(Ukrainian ‒ed.) that played in a loop. In other words, when there is nothing
new happening, but the same news reel, the same text, is played over and
over again…
People
simply stared at the television and could not tear themselves away, they
stopped caring about their surroundings. These semi-zombies are the ones who
volunteer to go fight in the war, collect food aid (for the Anti-Terrorist
Operation [ATO] ‒ed.) and seriously believe that the Russian Army, rather than
a local militia, is fighting in Ukraine.
ENF:
In other words, we are talking about some sort of brainwashing?
IS:
Yes, we are talking about brainwashing, you can say so. It is truly
brainwashing. Moreover, it has long-term effects—not merely fleeting. People
who receive this information, they react very aggressively to anything that
contradicts it.
ENF:
In your opinion, when did such influencing of the population begin—with the
commencement of the military operations in Novorossiya or even earlier?
IS:
Already during Maidan. While I was in Kiev in January 2014, watching Ukrainian
TV I could already feel the effects of massive exposure.
A
good person in war becomes better, while a wretched one—immeasurably more
wretched.
In other words, war is like a litmus test.
In other words, war is like a litmus test.
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Igor
Strelkov with a flag
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ENF:
Transnistria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Ukraine… There is a saying that war is a drug.
So-called “gunpowder poisoning” syndrome. What are your thoughts?
IS:
War can hardly be called a drug. But the man who fights a lot naturally gets
heightened doses of adrenaline, and the body gets used to them. Upon return to
peaceful life, first of all his body feels the lack of adrenaline, everything
seems grey, bland, in the sense that in war all events are highly compressed,
and the emotions that one experiences there in a week would, in normal life,
last him a year. As a result, the pace of life changes.
A
person whose body has adapted to a very high pace of life—even to exhaustion,
albeit a rich and colourful one—will find it fairly difficult to fit in
during peacetime.
Besides,
in war everything reaches extremes. Characters become sharply defined; people
reveal themselves clearly; human vices and human virtues are seen as if under a
magnifying glass. A good person in war becomes better, while a wretched
one—immeasurably more wretched. In other words, war is like a litmus test.
Those people who are used to living in wartime conditions, they find themselves
bound by a heightened sense of justice, they manifest a heightened sense of
camaraderie, they start dividing the world into “us” and “them.”
But
when they return to peaceful life, where everything is in semitones, they
remain on edge, and everything around them seems to them not quite true,
counterfeit. Not every person is able to adjust.
I,
for example, can easily adjust because I am not only used to it, but also have
sufficient knowledge and understanding of the situation. I can observe it from
the outside. Although even I experience breakdowns and relapses. But, overall,
I would not say that the condition of a person at war is abnormal.
There
is also a contrary point of view, that it is the condition of a person during
peacetime that is unnatural. We are all abnormal—each in his or her own way.
War strips the husk from a human being, and what remains is the essence.
They understood
in advance that Strelkov was unlikely to agree to these kinds of terms.
Therefore, measures were taken in advance to ensure that I handed over command.
Therefore, measures were taken in advance to ensure that I handed over command.
ENF:
In November of last year, the head of the DPR, Aleksandr Zakharchenko, awarded
you and Borodai with the title of Hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Was
this some kind of compensation for moral damages? I am talking about
Zakharchenko’s motivation.
IS:
I do not know Zakharchenko’s motivations. Considering the fact that at that
time Borodai and I had abruptly parted ways, I took this as a kind
of insult.
ENF:
What specifically offended you?
IS:
I do not think that Borodai did anything particularly heroic. Even though I am
not going to discuss any of his actions. Soldiers have a saying: “A scout and a
rearguard nurse got the Medal of Valour for doing the same thing.” This is
exactly how I took it. That’s the first point.
Secondly,
the current award policies of the DPR are beneath all criticism, and that is
why I am not going to accept any awards or titles from Zakharchenko. All the
more so now, when he has essentially demoted himself from the position of an
elected head of, albeit unrecognized, but nevertheless a Republic, to a manager
of some kind of “separate regions”—well, that’s just ridiculous.
ENF:
There are differing opinions about the reasons behind the replacement of
Strelkov and Borodai with local cadre. What can you tell us about this?
IS:
Negotiations with Ukraine were being prepared, and, naturally, it was
appropriate that they be conducted by local people. To this I had no objection.
On the other hand, the underlying motive for these negotiations—the future
“Minsk-1”—that somehow was developed on our side by that time, demanded
unconditional submission by all of the commanders to these terms. Since these
conditions, as it turned out, very much resembled a betrayal of Novorossiya,
the people [promoting them] understood in advance that Strelkov was unlikely to
agree to these kinds of terms. Therefore, measures were taken in advance to
ensure that I handed over command.
ENF:
In one of your interviews you said that you were strongly advised to promote
yourself publicly. What was the purpose of such publicity?
IS:
Yes, there was that. It is difficult for me to evaluate what tactical goal this
was meant to achieve; nor was it explained to me. In particular, in this case
the recommendation was made by Aleksandr Yuryevich (Borodai ‒ed.). He did not
explain to me why this was necessary. But the recommendation was made, and I
followed it.
“Do
what you must, come what may.” Do what you can.
Even of you are able to do the minimum—that’s something.
ENF:
Is your recently increased media activity a sign that you have political
ambitions, or is it more to do with the operations of “Novorossiya”, a movement
headed by you?
IS:
I have no political ambitions. But the volumes of fundraising in aid of
Novorossiya, its population and the Militia have plummeted. So my media
activity is an attempt to somehow raise the level of donations. The fact that
people in Russia have begun gradually to tire of the negative news from Ukraine
does not decrease the need for medicine, gear and food.
ENF:
How did you come to organise the “Novorossiya” movement?
IS:
Upon my return, after a certain period of quarantine, which I had to go through
following my return, I faced a question: “What am I to do next?” I would have
liked again to serve [in the military], but not only was I not offered any
opportunities for continuing to serve in Novorossiya or in Russia, none of my
requests in this regard received a response. In other words, relatively
speaking I found myself in the same situation as I was in before. Even worse,
because I was no longer employed, I became simply a military pensioner that no
one, frankly, had any need for.
I
could have, of course, gone to the country and sat on the beach catching fish
with a fishing rod. But since I feel a great deal of responsibility for what is
happening in Ukraine, and what is happening in Novorossiya, I found
this unacceptable.
Accordingly,
after discussing and thinking over all matters relating to how I could help
Novorossiya, I decided as follows: if I cannot help her with arms in my hands,
then I will take up something else that is truly needed—organizing supplies,
though totally out of character for me and not really my thing, as
they say.
For
me, believe me, this is something that is quite untypical and very uncomfortable.
But it must be done. I understand that it is necessary and also understand that
we will never be able to solve all the problems associated with logistics and
supply. Not even close. This is something that can only be addressed at the
level of a state. But… “Do what you must, come what may.” Do what you can. Even
of you are able to do the minimum—that’s something.
I
never planned on making a name for myself.
ENF:
Finally, a couple of personal questions, if you do not mind.
IS:
Try it. I cannot promise that I will answer.
ENF:
There is not a wealth of information about you in the Internet. Only meagre
details. I have read that you have a humanities education, that you are a
historian by training. At the same time, your biography suggests that you are a
real soldier, as they say, to the bone. Why did you not go through the standard
military education?
IS:
In the last years of school, the sight in my left eye seriously deteriorated
due to excessive reading. I no longer qualified for a regular military academy
as a result, and I did not want to attend a military-political one because my
grandfather had a serious dislike for military-political officers [zampolit]
(both of my grandfathers were career officers, both fought in the War). His—my
grandfather’s—opinion was very important to me.
As
a result, in this case, having assessed my prospects, I first made a choice to
do what I really loved. I loved history from childhood in school, and because
of that the choice of a higher education in history was a natural one. All the
more so because my cast of mind is suited to the humanities. Once I finished
the institute, after the Soviet Union fell and the unrest began, after wars
began, it so happened that I went to Transnistria as a volunteer.
Since
then, I have, of course, made returns to history, but only as a hobby. Although
I did write a number of scientific articles in between my professional
activities. But I never returned to it (history ‒ed.) on a
professional basis.
ENF:
Now for the final question. It has already become a tradition to question you
about your name change. The answers are well known. I have read that you were
born Vsevolodovich. People change their patronymics far less frequently than
their surnames…
IS:
Even now my passport says that my name is Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin. I never
changed my surname, my given name or my patronymic. I see nothing exceptional
about it. However, when I received pseudonymous documents for my first trip to
the “second Chechnya” as an officer of special services, I took a patronymic
after my grandfather. I took it for simple reasons: first of all,
“Vsevolodovich” is a relatively rare patronymic; secondly, it takes some time
to pronounce. Some people who took pseudonymous documents, they would even
change their names and become some sort of “Ivans Ivanovich Ivanov”. This is
quite common and normal.
I
have, incidentally, preserved the identity documents with this name that were
given to me by the Chechen Office (the Office of the FSB in the Chechen Republic
‒ed.). This was not done to change my surname. This is a common practice to
ensure the safety of servicemen who perform special assignments. And, well,
“Igor Strelkov”, it is just a literary pseudonym under which I
wrote articles.
I
considered it appropriate in Crimea and in Ukraine—where what I was doing
reminded me of special operations—to use the old pseudonym. I do not see it as
something positive or negative.
Moreover,
since I never planned on making a name for myself, it felt completely natural.
For instance, they asked in Crimea: “Who is this Igor Strelkov?” Well, only
Aksenov knew. But he also knew my real identity. A few others also knew about
me. The rest had never heard of Igor Strelkov…
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Pro-Russian
separatist commander Igor Girkin with his Stechkin APS Pistol.
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Igor Strelkov’s
Interview with Kolokol Rossii
⋅ July 17, 2015
Filed Under Donbass, Geopolitics, Igor Strelkov, Kolokol Rossii, Moldova, Novorossiya, Surkov, Transnistria, Ukraine
Original:
Novoros News
Translated by Linda Kadd / Edited by Tiago de Carvalho
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Igor Girkin/Strelkov: "It was me who
pulled the trigger of war (in Ukraine)"
[PHOTO SOURCE: https://twitter.com/dajeypetros/status/538370645084880897]
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Igor
Ivanovich presented his vision about how to solve the problem of Transnistria,
Novorossiya and Ukraine, his attitude towards the Kremlin camarilla and towards
Putin personally, as well as Putin’s role in the history of Russia.
Kolokol Rossii (KR): Igor Ivanovich, first of all, we
would like to know your position on Transnistria. It is currently the most
urgent topic. Is it possible to draw Russia into a conflict with Moldova and
Ukraine? Is the Ossetian scenario, for example, a possibility?
Igor Strelkov (Strelkov): I have already spoken about it. This
is yet another attempt to provoke Russia into direct participation in military
hostilities, but to provoke in such a way that our country plays the game
according to a scenario imposed by the enemy. I have no doubt that sooner or
later the enemy will succeed in dragging us into a war and the try to force us
to capitulate on the foreign policy front. But there is no chance of our
President capitulating—I simply do not believe it. The only question is: where
could this conflict take place? Transnistria is, for this purpose, an ideal
springboard. Let’s be frank—this area is surrounded on all sides by countries
hostile to Russia: Ukraine and Moldova. The fact that these countries are
hostile to us is, by the way, an ‘outstanding’ achievement of our diplomacy and
foreign policy. These ‘achievements’ include the fact that an absolutely
pro-Russian Transnistria where (according to various estimates), 150-200
thousand Russian citizens reside, is in a full blockade.
There
is no land connection with Transnistria, and the two countries that border this
“last fragment of the Soviet Union” are interested in the absence of Russian
troops there, as well as the non-existence of Transnistria itself. Accordingly,
Russia will have to act asymmetrically if she wants to protect her ally. We
either will have to get involved in an aerial war, which would be extremely
disadvantageous, considering that the enemy will have the significant advantage
of using ground-based anti-aircraft defences, or to attempt to punch a land
corridor through to Transnistria. The latter scenario would immediately be
labeled as Russian aggression against the independent states of Ukraine and
Moldova. Everything that is happening in Transnistria is the consequence of the
indecisiveness, and, I would also say, sabotage by certain individuals in the
Russian leadership who were tasked with dealing with the Ukrainian problem a
year ago. At that time, a single regiment or a brigade could have paved this
land corridor and accomplished what was done in Crimea (albeit only in the
territory from Kharkov to Odessa). But, a year later, we now find ourselves at
an impasse. Ukraine is definitily preparing for a war, and it is obvious that
it intends to attack Transnistria. Anti-aircraft defenses are being built up
and and troops—readied.
KR: And how will such a move be legally
formulated by Ukraine, since Transnistria is officially part of Moldova?
Strelkov: Of course, all this will done by
agreement with Moldova. Whenever I want to understand the actions of an enemy,
I ask myself how I would have acted in their stead. This is what I would have
done: Organized a few provocations on the border between Ukraine and
Transnistria, and then, under this pretext, Moldova would have issued an
ultimatum and demanded that Russia withdraw its peacekeepers.
KR: And if Russia does not remove the
troops? What then?
Strelkov: Yet another ultimatum—up to and
including asking Romania for military aid, and so forth. It all depends on
their understanding of how far Russia is willing to go. If they feel that
Russia is not ready to defend Transnistria with military force, they will crush
it straight away.
KR: And, for now, do they believe that
Russia is not ready?
Strelkov: They are trying to move forward in
small steps. How did they act in Slavyansk? First, they fired a series of
weapons. Has Russia swallowed this affront? Aha! Let us then use bigger
mortars! Again, Russia said nothing. Let’s try artillery. Again, Russia is
silent. Let’s try using chemical weapons. And use them they did—white
phosphorus incendiary shells! After that, they started shamelessly shelling the
city with heavy artillery. They understood that Moscow is not prepared to give
a real rebuff, and brazenly went ahead. In Transnistria, we are seeing evidence
of the same approach. In one of my statements, I already gave the example of
the frog that is slowly cooked over low heat. It does not realize until the end
that it is being cooked alive, it adapts at each stage until, finally, all of a
sudden it’s done for! The work to set up these provocations is now being done
by Saakashvili—a man who has absolutely zero regard for the welfare of Ukraine,
Odessa, and Russia.
KR: Do you think that his appointment was
specifically in relation to Transnistria?
Strelkov: I think that it is no coincidence!
Somehow, he was appointed not in Dnepropetrovsk, but in Odessa. It is no
accident that the Odessa region borders with Transnistria.
KR: What is the purpose of these actions?
To take Transnistria from Russia? To exact vengeance?
Strelkov: They have absolutely no interest in Transnistria
itself! It is only a small detail in a bigger geopolitical setup. The primary
goal is to force Putin to capitulate. To make him completely lose his
credibility and authority. Just like in the old legend, he was brought to a
crossroads: one road leads to war; the other—to surrender. What’s more, the
road to capitulation also splits—again into war and surrender. This is entire
system! If Russia had entered a direct conflict with Ukraine a year ago, then
the country and the President himself would have faced an huge number of
economic and political negatives, but there would have been enormous positives
too—from Kharkov to Odessa! Russia could have regained millions of Russian
people, as well as enormous economically developed territories… And now, more
than a year later, these advantages are already nonexistent. Now the number of
minuses has exceeded all positive aspects. The more we try to negotiate with
those, who are in principle against seeing eye to eye, the less our chances to
accomplish anything in the near future.
The
enemy is constantly getting stronger, it sees our indecisiveness. In the
capitalist world—in the world of real predators—everything is simple: If you do
not fight back, everyone gangs up against you, from the polar bear to the puny
cockroach, and each of them expects to get a piece of the bounty. At this point
in time, even Moldova feels that Russia is no bear and is trying to take a bite
out of her. The insolence of the Poles, the impudence of the Baltic States will
only grow—in step with our own movement backwards and attempts to negotiate.
As
it stands now, even if we try to secure the inviolability of Transnistria
through diplomatic means, for example by declaring that we are going to fight
for it, then, once again, we will end up in a trap. Remember the ‘marvelous’
“Kozak’s plan”, whereby we promised to respect the territorial integrity of
Moldova? Similarly, we now recognise the territorial integrity of Ukraine in
the Donbass. Wonderful! We no longer have any legal basis to intervene [in
Transnistria], except in line with the old agreement with Moldova. If,
tomorrow, the Moldovan Parliament decides to denounce this agreement, then we
will have no response—legally we would be forced to withdraw our troops.
KR: But Transnistria considers itself an
independent republic…
Strelkov: That’s what it claims, but no one has
recognised it as such. Transnistria has been an independent republic for a long
time (since 1992), and, unlike the DPR and the LPR, it never engaged in any
negotiations with Chisinau about becoming part of Moldova with some sort of
special rights. However, Russia continues to consider Transnistria to be part
of Moldova.
KR: But, if the agreement is denounced by
the Moldovan Parliament, then Russia could, in response, recognise the
independence of Transnistria—after all, that’s what we did with South Ossetia.
Is something like this even possible? And how would this affect the situation?
Strelkov: A recognition is possible. However if
the agreement is denounced, and we recognise Transnistria as an independent
state, then we would have to fight for it!
KR: Yes, just like in South Ossetia…
Strelkov: The only difference is that, in
Transnistria, we have nothing like the Roksky tunnel that would connect Russia
with this territory. We have only an air corridor, which we we are impeded from
using. Therefore, as I said, there are two solutions for Russia: either to
fight or capitulate.
KR: And in this case, could an order be
given to the Army of Novorossiya to go on the offensive?
Strelkov: The Army of Novorossiya is three
times smaller, in numerical terms, than its opponent. Do you think that such an
attack has a chance of victory?
KR: There are reports that two
combat-ready corps have been formed.
Strelkov: If, right now, I take a piece of
paper and draw up an order to form two combat-ready corps, this, alone, will
not yield two combat-ready corps. Yes, last Fall, the combat-readiness of the
Army of Novorossiya surpasses that of the Ukrainian Army, but this is no longer
the case. The waiting, the negotiations—came up with “Minsk-1” and
“Minsk-2″—have exacted their toll… Ukraine, on the other hand, did not waste
any time. Moreover, Ukraine’s resources, even in terms of manpower, many exceed
the resources of the Donbass—the enemy has simply has more people. Even if
every resident of Donetsk and Lugansk had a tank, the population would still
not turn into a tank corps. For a military person, this is crystal clear.
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The commander,
pictured with his bodyguards in Donetsk last week, claimed blood serum and
medication had been found at the site in eastern Ukraine [PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2697895/Now-rebel-commander-blamed-downing-MH17-says-bodies-aren-t-fresh-claims-corpses-dead-days.html]
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KR: Will there be a Minsk-3, but now in
relation to Transnistria, after provocations take place there? In order to
ensure that the toad is slowly boiled—to again hypnotize Russia?
Strelkov: Ukraine is obsessed with war. Like a
drug addict, who is addicted to hard drugs, Ukraine cannot stop fighting. It’s
a never-ending circle over there: prepare, assail Russia, get rebuffed, then
again get ready for another confrontation. Ukraine cannot exist in peace
because all of its resources are directed to war. A victory in this war is the
only miniscule chance that Ukraine has of surviving. They cannot freeze the
situation. They are doomed to keep fighting because freezing this situation
would automatically lead to the Kiev Junta’s downfall. For one simple reason:
as soon as there is no doping—in the form of an external enemy in Russia—then
uncomfortable questions will immediately begin: Why is everything so bad after
the “revolution of dignity”? Only a victory, a complete and total one, would
ensure the survival of Ukraine as a state, or rather as a pseudo-state. So they
will fight, regardless of the number of Minsk agreements that come to pass.
And
here I’ve been wondering: Is Vladislav Surkov (President’s Aide in relation to
the Commonwealth of Independent States—Ed.) a complete idiot? Very unlikely! He
is a smart and talented person. So, what are we to make of him? He could only
be a saboteur! It means that he designed the country’s policies in such a way
that they could never lead to success! He formulates the state policy, and,
time after time, restarts it: Minsk-1 failed, so he launched Minsk-2, and if
the second Minsk fails—he will launch the third! Meanwhile, external
circumstances for Russia deteriorate with each such restart. And I am a hundred
percent certain that he is well aware that all of this is doomed to failure.
It’s simply that this failure is in his interests. It’s profitable for him or
for his boss. And who is his boss?
KR: Who???
Strelkov: How did he end up in the Presidential
Administration? Let’s recall—he came from the Alfa Group. What is
this Alfa Group? It’s Friedman—it is with his help that foreign capital
came to Russia during the vaucher privatization period. Even now, Surkov and
Friedman are on excellent terms. The question proposes itself: Who do you work
for, Vladislav Yuryevich? For the President, or, perhaps, for someone else? The
answer, I think, is self-evidence. And it is not for the President.
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On June 29, at noon, a solemn consecration
ceremony of the banner of the 1st Volunteer Battalion of Slavyansk
took place in the Svyato-Voskresenskiy temple in the city of Slavyansk.
[PHOTO SOURCE: http://slavyangrad.org/2014/06/29/briefings-june-29-2014/]
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[eng
subs] Igor Strelkov interview: about US purposes in this war and Ukrainian
people
Published on Mar 6, 2015
[eng
subs] Igor Strelkov interview: about Ukrainians, how US uses them and purposes
of the US in this war.
Interview published on 06/03/15
VIDEO SOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGwUAqgYm5s
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Look-alike
of Igor Strelkov – Grandson of legendary Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov, Alexander
Arkadyevich Suvorov
[PHOTO
SOURCE: http://allrus.me/russian-officer-igor-strelkov/]
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